In this paper, bounds to the secrecy capacity region for the general 3-receiver broadcast channel with 3 degraded message sets, are presented for confidential messages sent to be kept secret from one of the receivers. This model is a more general model than 2-receiver broadcast channels with confidential messages with an external wiretapper, and recently studied 3-receiver degraded broadcast channels with confidential messages, since the conditions on the receivers are general and wiretapper receives the common message. Wyner's code partitioning combined with double-binning is used to show achievable rate tuples. Error probability analysis and equivocation calculation are also provided. The proof for the outer bound is shown for three cases: the general case; under the condition that receiver 1 is less noisy than receiver 3, the wiretapper; and under the condition that both receivers 1 and 2 are less noisy than the wiretapper, where the inner and outer bounds coincide, giving the secrecy capacity of the special case of a 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications channels today are vulnerable to eavesdropping or wiretapping due to the open nature of the channel, making the characterization of transmission rates that allow for both secure and reliable communication for the physical layer an important issue. In the wireless broadcast medium, the model of the broadcast channel (BC) with confidential messages, which was studied by Csiszár and Körner [1] , is used to study simultaneously secure and reliable communication. The model in [1] is a generalization of the characterization of the wiretap channel by Wyner [2] . In [1] , a common message is sent to 2 receivers, while a confidential message is sent to one of the receivers and kept secret from the other. The secrecy level is determined by the equivocation rate, which is the entropy rate of the confidential message conditioned on the channel output at the eavesdropper or wiretapper.
The secrecy capacity region is the set of transmission rates where the legitimate receiver decodes its confidential message while keeping the message secret from the wiretapper.
In more recent studies on the BC with confidential messages, Liu et al. [3] investigated the scenario where there are 2 receivers and private messages are sent to each one and kept secret from the unintended receiver; Xu et al. [4] studied the same model in [3] but with a common message to both receivers; Bagherikaram et al. [5] addressed the scenario where there are 2 receivers and one wiretapper, with confidential messages sent to the receivers. These studies were confined to 2 receivers, however. There have been recent studies where more than 2 receivers were considered. The authors in [6] and Ekrem and Ulukus in [7] independently studied the K-receiver BC with an external wiretapper. In [6] , the K-receiver BC with confidential messages sent to each receiver was studied, while in [7] , the same scenario was studied with the addition that each receiver also received a common message. Both used the degraded BC. We would like to characterize the transmission rates for the general BC with more than 2 receivers and with confidential messages.
Recently in [8] , Nair and El Gamal introduced the channel model of the 3-receiver BC with degraded message sets, which is a more general model than the 3-receiver degraded BC without secrecy constraints. In the general form of this model, a common message is sent to all of the receivers, denoted by the set R all , and the private messages, W 1 , . . . , W i , are sent to subsets of receivers R i ⊂ R i−1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ R 1 ⊂ R all . In [8] , two types of 3-receiver BCs with degraded message sets are studied: the first has 2 degraded message sets where the common message W 0 is sent to all three receivers and a private message W 1 is sent to the first receiver, while the second has 3 degraded message sets where W 0 is sent to all three receivers, W 1 is sent to receivers 1 and 2, and a second private message W 2 is sent to receiver 1.
In our earlier work [11] , we had studied the the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets, with the third receiver regarded as a wiretapper from which the private message is to be kept secret. In this paper, we consider the more general model of the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets where the third receiver is a wiretapper from which the private messages W 1 , W 2 are to be kept secret. As the wiretapper in this case also decodes the common message, this model describes a more general scenario than three types of scenarios: the 2-receiver BCs with an external wiretapper of [5] , the 2-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets and an external wiretapper, and 3-receiver degraded BCs with external wiretapper by virtue of the general conditions on the receivers.
For both types of 3-receiver BCs with degraded message sets without secrecy constraints, the inner capacity bound is shown to be achievable by superposition coding, Marton's achievability technique [9] and indirect decoding, in which the receivers decoding the common message only do so via satellite codewords instead of cloud centers. For the general 3-receiver BCs with degraded message sets, an outer bound to the capacity region is given in [8] only for the general 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets.
There are two special cases of the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets. The first is the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets where the first receiver is less noisy than the third receiver , a more general condition than degradedness [10] . The second is the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets where W 0 is sent to all the receivers and W 1 is sent to receivers 1 and 2 only. For the second special case, the inner and outer bounds coincide under the condition that first and second receivers are less noisy than the third receiver, respectively. Note that this special case describes a model that is different from the ones studied previously in [11] .
In our secure coding scheme, we shall use a combination of the code partitioning of Wyner [2] and double-binning of Liu et al. [3] to show achievability of an inner bound. Error probability analysis and equivocation calculation for the private messages is provided. We obtain outer bounds for the general case for the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, as well its two special cases. We show the converse proof first for the general case. We note that by removing the security constraints, we additionally obtain an outer bound to the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, which is not found in [8] . Then, we obtain the outer bound for the case where the first receiver is less noisy than the third receiver, which is again a new result, with or without secrecy constraints.
Also, under the condition that the first and second receivers are less noisy than the third receiver, respectively, the outer bound is obtained; this coincides with the inner bound, giving the secrecy capacity of the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets where W 0 is sent to all the receivers and W 1 is sent to receivers 1 and 2 only. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the model for the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets and give required definitions. In Section III we state our main results, the bounds to the secrecy capacity region. In Section IV we show achievability of the inner bound to the secrecy capacity region using our secure coding scheme and show error probability analysis and equivocation calculation for the private messages, while in Section V, we show the proof of the outer bounds for the general case of the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets and its two special cases. Lastly, we give conclusions in Section VI.
II. THE 3-RECEIVER BC WITH DEGRADED MESSAGE SETS
In this paper, we use the uppercase letter to denote a random variable (e.g., X) and the lowercase letter for its realization (e.g., x). The alphabet set of X is denoted by X so that x ∈ X . We denote a sequence of n random variables by X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) with its realization x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n if x i ∈ X for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Furthermore, we define the subsequences of X as X
. . , X n ), which we shall use in the proof of converse.
The discrete memoryless BC with 3 receivers has an input random sequence, X, and 3 output random sequences, Y 1 , Y 2 and Y 3 , at the receivers, all of length n, with x ∈ X n , y 1 ∈ Y n 1 , y 2 ∈ Y n 2 , and y 3 ∈ Y n 3 . The conditional distribution for n uses of the channel is
A (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , 2 nR2 , n)-code for the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets consists of
, (common message set)
, (private message set),
In particular, we have
1 ), and g 3 (Y 3 ) =Ŵ (3) 0 , where the notation "(·)" highlights that the decoded messages are estimates, with the error probability
In this setup, Y 3 is the wiretapper, and the secrecy level of W 1 sent to user 1 and 2 is defined by the equivocation
, while the secrecy level of W 2 sent to user 1 is defined by the equivocation rate
III. BOUNDS TO THE SECRECY CAPACITY REGION
For the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, the rate tuple (R 0 , R 1 , R 1e , R 2 , R 2e ) is said to be achievable if for any η, ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 , ǫ 1,2 > 0, there exists a sequence of (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , 2 nR2 , n)-codes for which P (n) e ≤ η and equivocation rates R 1e and R 2e satisfy
The secrecy capacity region (i.e., the rate region with perfect secrecy or R 1e = R 1 and R 2e = R 2 ) for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets is the closure of the set of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) such that
The following theorems summarize the main results of this paper.
Theorem 1:
An inner bound to the secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
in which R
, over the the probability density function (p.d.f.)
which induces the Markov chain conditions
The auxiliary random variables U 1 , U 2 and U 3 will be defined in Section IV (random codebook generation).
Proof: The proof of achievability for this inner bound is given in Section IV-A with the equivocation calculation to be presented in Section IV-B.
Theorem 2: An outer bound to the secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets is the closure of all rate-tuples
Proof: The proof for this outer bound is given in Section V-A.
We see that, by removing the secrecy constraints from the outer bound to the secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, we can obtain an outer bound to the capacity region without secrecy.
We see this by removing R ′ 1 and P ′ 1 from Theorem 2 above. Corollary 1: An inner bound to the secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets for the case where receiver Y 1 is less noisy than receiver Y 3 is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) satisfying
over the the probability density function (
Corollary 2: An outer bound to the secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets for the case where receiver Y 1 is less noisy than receiver Y 3 is the closure of all rate-tuples
Proof: See Section V-B for the converse proof.
The inner and outer bounds are achievable by setting U 3 = U 1 in Theorems 1 and 2 and using the condition that
. This is a more general one than the condition that Y 3 is a degraded version of Y 1 . Thus, a more general class of channels is considered than the 3-receiver degraded BC case. Also, this channel class with wiretapper is more general than the case of the 2-receiver BC with wiretapper since the wiretapper receives W 0 as well. Again, by removing secrecy constraints, we get inner and outer bounds for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets with Y 1 less noisy than Y 3 . We see this by removing the term I(U 2 ; Y 3 |U 1 ) for rates involving R 1 and I(X; Y 3 |U 2 ) for rates involving R 2 .
Corollary 3:
The secrecy capacity region for the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets for the case where receiver Y 1 and Y 2 are both less noisy than receiver Y 3 is the closure of all rate-tuples (R 0 , R 1 ) satisfying
Proof: See Section V-C for the converse proof.
In this channel class, the inner and outer bounds match. Proof of achievability follows by using code partitioning for security, as in [1] and [2] . The capacity region in Corollary 3 is achievable by setting R 2 = 0, U 2 = X, Liu et al. [3] to provide secrecy, together with the coding scheme for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets found in [8] .
The scheme of [8] represents W 0 by U 1 , then breaks W 2 into 2 parts. The first part is combined with U 1 by superposition coding to generate U 3 . The message W 1 is combined with U 1 by superposition coding to generate U 2 . Next, U 2 and U 3 are partitioned into bins. The product bin containing the joint typical pair from U 2 and U 3
(achievable by Marton's coding scheme) is combined with the second part of W 2 by superposition coding to obtain X. We note that we directly use U 2 to represent information about W 1 , instead of using another auxiliary random variableŨ 2 to do so as in [8] . In any case it is shown in [8, Appendix III] that it is optimal to set U 2 =Ũ 2 . Thus there is no loss of generality to directly use U 2 to represent information about W 1 .
At the receivers, Y 1 decodes U 1 , U 2 , U 3 , and X to recover the messages W 0 , W 1 and W 2 , while Y 2 decodes U 1 and U 2 to recover messages W 0 and W 1 and Y 3 decodes U 1 indirectly using U 3 to recover W 0 . In our secure scheme, the codewords U 2 and X are, respectively, protected from receiver Y 3 (i.e., the wiretapper) by a one-sided double-binning and code partitioning. This is depicted in Figure 1 .
Suppose we have the probability density function (p.d.f.) in (5) which induces the Markov chain conditions
The following describes the encoding and decoding processes.
Codebook generation:
Define, for security,
where δ 1 > 0 and is small for n sufficiently large. First, generate 2 nR0 sequences U 1 (w 0 ), for w 0 ∈ W 0 , randomly and uniformly from the set of typical U 1
2 ) randomly uniformly from the set of conditionally typical U 2 sequences, and also 2 nQ3 sequences U 3 (w 0 , q 3 ) randomly uniformly from the set of conditionally typical U 3 sequences. The 2 nQ2 sequences U 2 (w 0 , q 2 , q ′ 2 ) are partitioned into 2 nQ2e groups of sequences with 2 nQ ′ 2 sequences in each group, and indexed by q 2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nQ2e } and q
Next randomly partition the sequences, U 2 (w 0 , q 2 , q Each product bin (w 1 , w
} with high probability [12] ,
Now let us rewrite the joint typical pair as (u 2 (w 1 , w
For each such pair corresponding to the product bin (w 1 , w Encoding: To send (w 0 , w 1 , w 2 ), express w 2 by (p 1 , p 3 ) and send the codeword x(w 0 , w 1 , w
to denote the set of jointly strong typical n-sequence with respect to the p.d.f. p(z). We shall look at the error rates at each receiver.
Assume that (w 0 , w 1 , p 3 , p 1 ) = (1, 1, 1, 1) is sent to receiver 1 and w ′ 1 and p ′ 1 can be arbitrary. At receiver 1, the decoder seeks the indices (w 0 , w 1 , p 3 , p 1 ) so that
If there is none or more than one possible codeword, an error is declared. The error events at receiver 1 may be divided into:
are not jointly typical with y. By the properties of strong typical sequences [13] , Pr{E 1 } ≤ ǫ ′ , where ǫ ′ → 0 for large n.
b) E 2 : w 0 = 1, with arbitrary w 1 , p 3 , p 1 , with u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x jointly typical with y 1 . Then we have
where δ → 0 as ǫ → 0 for n sufficiently large. For Pr{E 2 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we require
since I(U 1 , U 2 , U 3 ; Y 1 |X) = 0 by the Markov chain condition
c) E 3 : w 0 = 1, w 1 = 1, with arbitrary p 3 , p 1 , with u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x jointly typical with y 1 . Then we have
For Pr{E 3 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we require
where the second line is due to
with arbitrary p 1 , and u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x jointly typical with y 1 . Then we have
For Pr{E 4 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we require
where the first term in (a) is due to U 1 → U 2 → X → Y 1 and the second term is due to
x jointly typical with y 1 . Then we have
For Pr{E 5 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we require
where the equality is due to
e) E 6 : w 0 = 1, w 1 = 1, p 3 = 1, p 1 arbitrary and u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , x jointly typical with y 1 . Then we have
For Pr{E 6 } ≤ ǫ ′ , we require
where the first term of (a) is due to U 1 → U 3 → X → Y 1 and the second term of (a) and (b) are due to
Consequently, under the conditions (14), (17), (19), (21), (23) listed above, the error probability at receiver 1 is less than
Now assume that (w 0 , q 2 ) = (1, 1) is sent to receiver 2 and that q ′ 2 is arbitrary. At receiver 2, the decoder seeks the message so that
If there is none or more than one possible codeword, an error is declared. The error events at receiver 2 may be divided into:
are not jointly typical with y 2 . By the properties of strong typical sequences Pr{E
2 : w 0 = 1, q 2 arbitrary and u 1 , u 2 are jointly typical with y 2 . Then we have
Then, for Pr{E
c) E ′ 3 : w 0 = 1, q 2 = 1, and u 1 , u 2 are jointly typical with y 2 . Then we have
Thus, under the conditions (26) and (28), the error probability at receiver 2 is less than
At receiver 3, indirect decoding is used [8] . The decoder estimates w 0 such that (u 3 (w 0 , q 3 ), y 3 ) ∈ T n ǫ (P U3Y3 ) for any q 3 ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nQ3 }. Assuming that (w 0 , q 3 ) = (1, 1) is sent, we require
for the error probability at receiver 3 to be small for n sufficiently large. Combining (11), (14), (17), (19), (21), (23), (26), (28) and (29) using Fourier-Motzkin elimination with R 1e = R 1 and R 2e = P 1e + P 3 = R 2 for perfect secrecy, we can obtain the inner bound to the secrecy capacity region in Theorem 1. We note that when we carry out the Fourier-Motzkin procedure, Q 2e , Q ′ 2 and Q 3 are eliminated. Thus in practice, the sizes in the partitioning of U 2 via 2 n(Q2e+Q ′ 2 ) sequences can be arbitrary.
B. Equivocation calculation
In this section we show that the equivocation rate satisfies the security conditions in (3). We shall make use of the relation
For the message W 1 , the equivocation can be bounded as
where (a) is by (30), (b) and (c) have first two terms by (30), and (d) has first term in the square brackets
. Now bound each term in (31) separately. For the first term, given u 1 , U 2 has 2 n(R1e+R
codewords with equal probability. Thus
The second term can be bounded by [3] 
where δ ′ > 0 and is small for n sufficiently large. For the third term, by Fano's inequality, we have
where ǫ ′ 2,n → 0 for n sufficiently large. To show that λ(w ′ 1 ) ≤ 2κ where κ → 0 for n sufficiently large so that (34) holds, consider decoding at the wiretapper and the codebook with rate R ′ 1 to be decoded at the wiretapper with error probability λ(w ′ 1 ). Let W 1 = w 1 and W 0 = w 0 be fixed. We note that the wiretapper decodes U 2 first as it will then use this knowledge to decode X later. The wiretapper decodes U 2 given W 1 = w 1 and U 1 = u 1 , by finding the index w ′ 1 , so that
If there is none or more than one possible codeword, an error is declared. Now define the event
Then assuming that u 2 (w 0 , w 1 , 1) is sent,
where δ → 0 as ǫ → 0 for n sufficiently large. Thus since we have chosen R ′ 1 = I(U 2 ; Y 3 |U 1 ) − δ 1 for the double-binning partition, we will get λ(w 
,n , and the equivocation rate satisfies (3a).
where (a) is by (30), (b) and (c) have first two terms by (30), and (d) has first term in the square brackets by
Bound each term in (38) separately. For the first term, given u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , X has 2 n(R1e+R
3 ) codewords with equal probability. Thus
The second term is bounded by [3] I(X;
where ǫ 
If there is none or more than one possible codeword, an error is declared. Define the event
where w 0 , w 1 , w
(1)
where δ → 0 as ǫ → 0 for n sufficiently large. Since we have chosen
where the second equality above is by the Markov chain condition 
,n , and the equivocation rate satisfies (3b).
For the combined message W 1 , W 2 , we have
where (a) is by (30), (b) and (c) have first two terms by (30), (d) has first term in the square brackets by
, (e) has second and third terms by
where (f) has second term by U 1 → U 3 → Y 3 and third term by
We bound each term in (45). For the first term,
Given u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , X has 2 n(R1e+R
3 ) codewords with equal probability. We also have I(U 2 ; U 3 |U 1 ) ≤ I(U 2 ; U 3 |U 1 ) + nδ ′ , giving
. The second and third terms can be bounded as in (33) and (40). For the fourth term, we have
from (34) and (41). Substituting the above in (45), we have that
where
,n , thus satisfying (3c). So we see that the security conditions in (3) are satisfied and we have shown that the secret rate tuple (R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) is achievable.
V. OUTER BOUNDS FOR THE 3-RECEIVER BC WITH DEGRADED MESSAGE SETS

A. Proof for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets
In this section we show the converse proof for the general outer bound in Theorem 2. We use a (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , 2 nR2 , n)-code with error probability P (n) e with the code construction so that we have the Markov chain condition
By Fano's inequality, we have
3 ), satisfying the conditions
for all i.
To prove the rates R 0 , we may follow the method in [8] , but with the above auxiliary random variable definitions. We have
We also have
where (a) is by Lemma 7 of [1] from which I(Y i−1
3 ) → W 2 and (c) is because it can be shown that
For rates R 1 , we firstly consider the rate for W 1 sent to receiver Y 1 . We have,
where (a) is by Fano's inequality. Expanding the first two terms of (a) by the chain rule, we obtain
By I(S 1 , S 2 ; T |V ) = I(S 1 ; T |V ) + I(S 2 ; T |S 1 , V ) and use of Lemma 7 of [1], we have
The terms under the summation can be bounded by
where (a) is by the fact that
2 ). The second term in (59) is then
for the first term and
for the second term, and (e) is due to I(U 1,i ; Y 3,i |U 2,i ) = 0. Then we have
Next consider the rate for W 1 sent to receiver Y 2 . We have, following (56),
where (a) is by Fano's inequality. For the first term in (62), we have
where (b) is by Lemma 7 of [1] and (c) is due to the fact that it can be shown that
1 . For the second term in (62) we have
where (a) is due to I(Y i−1
and we also have
2 . Then we have
The first term of (62) can also be expressed as
where (a) is due to
where the first equality above is due to
1 . Thus we also have
For rates R 2 , we consider the rate for W 2 sent to receiver Y 1 . We have, following the same procedure to obtain (56),
by Fano's inequality. Expanding the first two terms of the inequality above by the chain rule and following the same procedure as for R 1 in (57a), (57b) to (58), we obtain
The terms under the summation can be bounded as
where (a) is by following the steps in the chain of inequalities (59) until step (a) in (59) while using
The second term of the last line of (71) is then
. Then we will have
For the rates (R 0 + R 1 ), we first consider the combined message (W 0 , W 1 ) sent to receiver Y 1 . We have
Then we have, on combining with H(W 0 ),
and
Next consider the combined message (W 0 , W 1 ) sent to receiver Y 2 . We have
Using (63), (64) and (66) and combining with H(W 0 ), we obtain
For rates (R 0 + R 2 ) consider the combined message (W 0 , W 2 ) sent to receiver Y 1 . We have
Then, using (71), (72) and combining with H(W 0 ), we obtain
Lastly, for the rates (R 0 + R 1 + R 2 ), consider the combined message (W 0 , W 1 , W 2 ) sent to receiver Y 1 :
where (a) results in following the steps in (56) using
is by Fano's inequality, and (c) results in following the steps in the chain of inequalities (59) up till one step before step (a) in (59) with
instead of W 1 . The term under summation in (85) can be bounded in two ways. For the first way, we have
and by the fact that
The second term in (86) may be shown to be equal to I(U 2,i ; Y 3,i |U 1,i ) + I(X i ; Y 3,i |U 2,i , U 3,i ) as follows. We have
where (a) is because
, and (b) is due to
and (c) is obtained by following the steps in the chain of inequalities (46). Then we will have
(88)
The second way to bound the term under summation in (85) is as follows. We now have
and also by the fact that 
Finally, introduce random variable G, independent of all other random variables and taking on values i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, with probability 1/n. Define
Then, we can obtain the rate regions in Theorem 2 using (54), (55), (61), (65), (68), (73), (75), (76), (78), (79), (80), (81), (83), (84), (91), (92), (93) and (94).
B. Proof for the 3-receiver BC with Y 1 less noisy than Y 3
In this section we show the converse proof for the outer bound of Corollary 2, where receiver Y 1 is less noisy than receiver Y 3 . Use the same code construction as in Section V-A, but have a new definition for the auxiliary
2 ) so that the condition
is satisfied for all i.
For rate R 0 we have
For rates R 1 , consider the rate for W 1 sent to receiver Y 1 and follow the method in Section V-A, via equations (56), (57a), (57b), (58) and (59) till step (a) of (59). We have
The term under the summation can be bounded as
where (a) has first term by
2 ). Thus we have
Now consider the rate for W 1 sent to receiver Y 2 . We get, following (62)
For the first term of (100) we have
where (a) has first term due to
3 ). For the second term in (100) we have
where (a) is by I(Y
2 ). Then we have
Next, for rate R 2 , consider message W 2 sent to receiver Y 1 . Following the steps to get (69), (70), and step (a) of (71), we have
The term under the sum is bounded as
For rates (R 0 + R 1 ), we first look at the message (W 0 , W 1 ) sent to receiver Y 1 . We have
from which we obtain
where (a) is by the use of I(U 1,i ; Y 3,i ) ≤ I(U 1,i ; Y 1,i ) which results from Y 1 being a less noisy receiver than Y 3 .
Next, for the message (W 0 , W 1 ) sent to receiver Y 2 ,
For rate (R 0 + R 2 ) we have
For rates (R 0 + R 1 + R 2 ), we have, from (85),
from which the term under summation is bounded by
2 ) → Y 1,i resulting in the first two terms of the line above (a) going to zero, and (b) is due to
3 ) = 0. Then, combining with H(W 0 ) we can obtain
The term under summation in (111) may also be bounded as
where (a) has first term due to the condition 
where in (a) we have used the condition that I(U 1,i ; Y 3,i ) ≤ I(U 1,i ; Y 1,i ) which is a consequence of Y 1 being a less noisy receiver than Y 3 .
Finally introduce the random variables G, X, Y k , k = 1, 2, 3, and U k , k = 1, 2 as at the end of Section V-A, and using (96), (99), (103), (106), (108), (109), (113) and (115), we can obtain the rate regions in Corollary 2, and so the converse is shown.
C. Proof for the 3-receiver BC with both Y 1 and Y 2 less noisy than Y 3
In this section we show the converse proof for the bound in Corollary 3. We now use a (2 nR0 , 2 nR1 , n)-code with error probability P p(y 1i , y 2i , y 3i |x i ).
We now also define the new auxiliary random variable U i (W 0 , Y i−1
2 ) satisfying the condition
for all i. The rate R 0 may be easily found as 
We now have 
If we were to consider W 1 sent to receiver Y 2 instead, we will similarly obtain
where we have used the expansion
The term under summation in (120) can be bounded as 
where (a) is by the condition I(U i ; Y 3,i ) ≤ I(U i ; Y 2,i ) from Y 2 being less noisy than Y 3 .
Finally, introduce the random variables G, X, Y k , k = 1, 2, 3, as at the end of Section V-A, and the random variable U (G, U G ). Using (118), (124), (126), (127) and (128), we obtain the rate region in Corollary 3, and the converse is shown.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bounds to the secrecy capacity region for the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets, in which receiver 3 is a wiretapper receiving the common message, are presented. This model is a more general model than the 2-receiver BCs with confidential messages with an external wiretapper, and 3-receiver degraded BCs with confidential messages. In the proof of achievability for the inner bound, we used Wyner's code partitioning combined with double-binning for secrecy. The proof for the outer bound is shown for three cases: the general case; under the condition that receiver 1 is less noisy than the wiretapper; and under the condition that both receivers 1 and 2 are less noisy than the wiretapper, where the inner and outer bounds coincide, giving the secrecy capacity of the special case of the 3-receiver BC with 2 degraded message sets. We obtain, with and without secrecy, new outer bounds for the general 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets; and new inner and outer bounds for the 3-receiver BC with 3 degraded message sets with receiver 1 less noisy than receiver 3.
